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The crop insurance industry enjoyed another banner year in 2007, collecting $6.5 billion 
in premiums yet paying out only 
$3.2 billion in losses. I estimate that 
the industry will collect a record 
$2.8 billion from taxpayers. In con-
trast, the net amount that farmers 
received from the program in 2007 
was only $750 million. Interestingly, 
since the beginning of this decade, 
the $11.3 billion in net payments to 
farmers (indemnities received mi-
nus farmer-paid premiums) is about 
equal to the amount that taxpayers 
have paid the industry ($11.1 bil-
lion). Overall, taxpayers have spent 
more than $22 billion since 2000 
delivering about $11 billion in net 
payments to farmers, making crop 
insurance one of the least-effi cient 
means by which taxpayers support 
the farm sector.
The scale of this ineffi ciency is 
well known to regular readers of this 
Review. What is diffi cult to under-
stand is why the program persists in 
its present form when more effi cient 
risk management programs could 
be adopted in the farm bill. One 
explanation is that campaign contri-
butions from crop insurance com-
panies and agents have persuaded 
key members of Congress to support 
continuation of the program. An al-
ternative explanation is that farmers 
in certain regions excessively benefi t 
from the program and that members 
from these regions are protecting 
the interests of their farmers. Sup-
port for this hypothesis comes from 
Senator Roberts from Kansas and 
Senator Conrad from North Dakota 
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who have argued that reform of 
the crop insurance program threat-
ens the viability of the program in 
those regions that depend most 
heavily on insurance payments. 
Specifi cally, they worry that a drop 
in crop insurance participation 
by Corn Belt farmers might force 
farmers in higher risk areas to pay 
more for insurance.
Implicit in this worry is the 
assumption that industry profi ts 
generated by Corn Belt farmers 
allow farmers in other regions to 
pay lower insurance premiums 
than they would have to pay oth-
erwise. If this is true, then if Corn 
Belt farmers dropped out of the 
program, other regions would suf-
fer. An examination of recent crop 
insurance data offers support for 
this conjecture.
Experience with Crop Insurance 
Since 2000
Participation in the crop insurance 
program was given a large boost 
with passage of increased premi-
um subsidies that were included in 
the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protec-
tion Act. Since that time, 
farmers have had to pay 
a bit less than half the 
amount that USDA’s Risk 
Management Agency 
(RMA) has determined is 
needed to cover insured 
crop losses. This amount 
is called the actuarially 
fair premium. The large 
premium subsidy means 
that if all farmers pay 
actuarially fair premiums 
then the ratio of indemni-
ties received (crop losses 
covered) to farmer-paid 
premium should equal two. While 
the period since 2000 in looking 
at crop losses is too short a time 
to judge actuarial fairness of crop 
insurance premiums, it is instruc-
tive to see if there is a discernible 
geographic pattern to the ratios 
since 2000. 
As shown in Figure 1 on page 2, 
Great Plains states all have ratios 
greater than 2.0 while farmers in 
the fi ve Corn Belt states all have ra-
tios less than 2.0. This shows that 
farmers in the Great Plains have 
benefi ted far more than have Corn 
Belt farmers from crop insurance. 
Note that Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa 
all have ratios less than 1.0. This 
means that farmers in these three 
states have paid more dollars in 
premiums than have been returned 
to them in indemnities. That is, far 
from receiving subsidized premi-
ums, Corn Belt farmers have, in 
fact, been paying more into the 
program than they have gotten in 
return.
Another way of looking at 
the distribution of crop insur-
ance payments is to simply add 
up premiums paid and indemni-
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ties received. As shown in Figure 
2, Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, 
and South Dakota have all re-
ceived more than $1 billion in net 
payments since 2000. In contrast, 
farmers in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa 
together paid $750 million more in 
premiums than they have received 
from the program. Clearly, the recent 
experience in crop insurance suggests 
that Corn Belt farmers are paying too 
much in premiums, and Great Plains 
Figure 2. Total indemnities received minus farmer-paid premiums from 
2000 to 2007
Figure 1. Ratio of total indemnities received to farmer-paid premiums 
from 2000 to 2007
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farmers (among others in the country 
not shown) are paying too little.
Corn Belt Contributions to 
Industry Profi ts
Each year, the crop insurance 
program allows companies to keep 
some of the gains in states where 
premiums exceed losses in ex-
change for taking on some of the 
risk in states where losses exceed 
premiums. The program also al-
lows companies fl exibility in choos-
ing how much of the gain or loss 
they want to keep in each state. 
Companies have learned to keep 
as much of the risk as possible in 
the Corn Belt states and to give the 
government as much of the risk as 
possible in higher-risk states. Thus, 
it should come as no surprise that 
much of the net underwriting gains 
paid to companies are generated in 
the Corn Belt states.
Total underwriting gains paid 
to the crop insurance industry 
range from -$52 million in 2002 to 
an estimated $1.5 billion in 2007. To 
estimate the contribution to these 
gains that the Corn Belt made, pre-
miums and losses were calculated 
each year for the top fi ve corn 
and soybean states: Iowa, Illinois, 
Minnesota, Indiana, and Nebraska. 
Underwriting gains for each state 
were then calculated using the 
rules laid out in the Standard Re-
insurance Agreement. The results 
are shown in Figure 3.
In almost every year, more than 
50 percent of the underwriting 
payments to crop insurance com-
panies were generated by just two 
crops in fi ve states. Since 2000, 67 
percent of total underwriting gains 
have been generated by corn and 
soybeans in these fi ve states, even 
though these state-crop combina-
tions generated only 32 percent 
of the premiums. Adding under-
writing gains to the 32 percent of 
administrative and operating sub-
sidies that are paid to the compa-
nies, it’s easy to conclude that corn 
and soybean insurance in just fi ve 
states generates 50 percent of the 
revenue to the crop insurance in-
dustry and most of its profi ts. From 
this perspective it is clearly true 
that if Corn Belt farmers left the 
program, then offering insurance 
to farmers in the other parts of the 
country would be much less attrac-
tive to the industry.
Is Corn Belt Insurance Overrated?
Excessive profi ts insuring Corn 
Belt farmers must imply that Corn 
Belt insurance premiums are too 
high relative to the risks covered. 
Before we can conclude that crop 
insurance premiums on corn and 
soybeans are too high in the Corn 
Belt, we must consider the repre-
sentativeness of growing conditions 
from 2000 to 2007. Overall, the re-
cent experience in the Corn Belt is 
likely more favorable than what can 
be expected over any eight-year 
period. Although there were region-
al droughts that affected yields in 
2002 and 2005, there has not been 
a widespread drought in the Corn 
Belt since 1988. Furthermore, the 
mechanism by which crop insur-
ance rates are adjusted is based 
on a rolling 25-year average of 
losses within each state. The recent 
good experience in the Corn Belt 
is slowly making itself felt in lower 
premium rates for farmers.
However, there is good evidence 
that production risks are falling 
much faster than crop insurance 
rates can adjust because of rapid ad-
vances in technology, especially for 
corn. The recently approved Biotech 
Yield Endorsement reduces crop 
insurance rates for Corn Belt farm-
ers who plant certain biotech seeds. 
This program demonstrates that 
modern corn hybrids are less risky 
than assumed by RMA rate-making 
methods. Today’s corn is much bet-
ter able to withstand insect infes-
tations, late-season wind damage, 
excess moisture, and extended dry 
conditions than corn that was plant-
ed 20 years ago. Approval of simi-
lar endorsements will be needed 
to bring Corn Belt insurance rates 
more in line with risks. 
Alternative Means of Insuring 
Corn Belt Risks
The crop insurance industry argues 
that it needs to generate large un-
derwriting gains in favorable years Figure 3. Where are the underwriting gains generated?
Continued on page 11
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to generate reserves to cover years 
with negative underwriting gains. 
However, farmers in the Corn Belt 
are beginning to wonder whether 
crop insurance is such a good deal 
for them. Why should they be asked 
year after year to generate large un-
derwriting gains so that the indus-
try will be willing to offer insurance 
in other states? Why should they 
keep generating excessive annual 
agent commissions when they rare-
ly receive payments that exceed 
their premiums? Since 2000, agent 
commissions on policies sold to 
corn and soybean farmers in Iowa, 
Illinois, and Indiana have totaled 
more than $933 million, whereas 
corn and soybean farmers in these 
three states have paid $768 million 
more in premiums than they have 
collected in indemnities.
The initial push in early 2007 by 
the National Corn Growers Associa-
tion to include a county revenue coun-
tercyclical program in the new farm 
bill refl ected a belief by corn farmers 
that a reduction in the role of the crop 
insurance industry as a risk-manage-
ment middleman would better serve 
both farmers and taxpayers. Their 
county program was immediately op-
posed by the crop insurance industry 
because it would have dramatically 
increased the proportion of taxpayer 
support for risk management that 
would have fl owed directly to farm-
ers. Given the results of the analysis 
shared here, it is clear why their pro-
posal was also attacked by politicians 
and commodity groups from Great 
Plains states: reducing participation 
in crop insurance by Corn Belt farm-
ers would dramatically reduce indus-
try profi ts, which would threaten the 
willingness of companies to insure 
farmers in states where premiums 
have not kept pace with losses.
It’s possible that an optional 
state-level revenue countercyclical 
program will emerge in the new farm 
bill. However, it would not be surpris-
ing if those farmers who opt for this 
policy will be required to purchase 
crop insurance. Such a requirement 
would refl ect the infl uence of indus-
try interests that are aligned with 
regional interests in maintaining, 
for as long as possible, the current 
structure of the program. ◆ 
Note of Disclosure: The author has 
worked as a consultant for the National 
Corn Growers Association estimating the 
cost of various farm bill alternatives.
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Figure 3. Agent commission per corn, soybean, wheat, and cotton         
policy sold
Crop Insurance Services shows that 
all cost categories but one have large-
ly tracked with general labor markets. 
The one exception is agent commis-
sions, which track directly with crop 
prices and premiums in the program. 
As shown in Figure 3, this means that 
the commission per written policy 
has increased from $351 per policy 
in 2000 to an estimated $1,357 per 
policy in 2008. The reason for this rise 
in agent commissions is that under 
crop insurance rules, companies can-
not compete on the prices of policies 
because these are set by the govern-
ment. The only way for companies 
to compete with each other is to vie 
for agents’ policies. This competition 
results in changes in taxpayer subsi-
dies being directly refl ected in agent 
commissions.  ◆
Note: Policy numbers are calculated 
from data obtained from the RMA Sum-
mary of Business Reports. Commissions 
are calculated from “Federal Crop Insur-
ance Program Profi tability and Effective-
ness Analysis, 2007 Update,” prepared 
on behalf of the National Crop Insurance 
Services by Grant Thornton LLP.
